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NOTRE DAME
LAWYER
A Quarterly Law Review
VOL. XX

MARCH, 1945

NO. 3

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEES OF LIBERTY

I
IN

MEDIEVAL ENGLAND

AT the outset it maybe asked, what is meant by "liberty"?
In the nineteenth century there was no difficulty in answering that question. Kant's idea of the liberty of each
the free self-assertion of each - limited only by the like
liberty of all, subject only to the possibility of like free selfassertion by all, was generally accepted. Liberty was a condition in which free exercise of the will was restrained only
so far as necessary to secure a harmonious co-existence of the
free will of each and the free will of all others. But I am not
speaking of the Kantian idea of liberty, in which my generation was brought up. Whatever "liberty" may mean today,
the liberty guaranteed by our bills of rights is a reservation
to the individual of certain fundamental reasonable expectations involved in life in civilized society and a freedom from
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the power and authority of those who are designated or chosen in a politically
organized society to adjust relations and order conduct and
so are able to apply the force of that society to individuals.
Liberty under law implies a systematic and orderly applica-
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tion of that force so that it is uniform, equal and predictable,
and proceeds from reason and upon understood grounds
rather than from caprice or impulse or without full and fair
hearing of all affected and understanding of the facts on
which official action is taken.
Using the term liberty in that sense, I think of four periods
in the development of constitutional guarantees of liberty
such as we know them. They are: (1) Medieval England the Conquest to the Reformation; (2) the era of the Tudors
and Stuarts, from the Reformation to the Revolution of
1688; (3) the American colonies down to the Declaration of
Rights of the Continental Congress (1774); and (4) the era
of written constitutions culminating in the federal Bill of
Rights (1791). This period might well be taken to extend to
the last new state to be admitted with a constitution of its
own framing - Oklahoma in 1907. But I stop with the adoption of the first nine amendments to the federal Constitution
(1791). From that time to the second decade of the present
century we are but developing the applications of the constitutional guarantees as they had grown up from the Middle
Ages and from Coke's exposition of them in the seventeenth
century. The Fourteenth Amendment did no more than apply
a significant provision of the Fifth Amendment to the states,
which already had this provision in their own bills of rights,
so as to give it the additional protection of the federal courts
as against the states. Whether that period has come to an
end in the present generation only the future can say. If it
has, I see no basis for assured prophecy of what course the
development will take in a new period. But thus far, on the
whole, all English-speaking people have stood firm for what
they have regarded as their birthright of liberty.
My approach to the subject in these lectures will be historical - how these guarantees of liberty have in fact grown
up and been shaped from century to century by the exigencies of a balance ibetween those who wield the force of organized society and the individuals subject to their authority.
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Behind this balance is the maintaining and furthering of
civilization, of the developing of human powers to constantly
greater completeness - the maximum of human control over
external or physical nature and over internal or human nature of which men are capable for the time being. It is the
latter, the control over human nature, achieved mastery over
internal nature, which has made our control over physical
nature possible; and it has 'been achieved and is maintained
by social control, by the pressure upon each man brought to
bear by his fellow men in groups and associations and relations in order to constrain him to do his part in upholding
civilized society and to deter him from conduct at variance
with the postulates of the social order. There is a task of adjusting relations and ordering conduct so that conflicting and
ovc-lapping claims and demands and desires may be reconciled or made compatible with each other with a minimum of
friction and waste. This becomes the task of politically organized society. It comes to be achieved through law.
In adjusting relations and ordering conduct by the systematic application of the force of a politically organized society
we encounter a problem of balance between the general
security and the individual life and between two basic tendencies in the individual himself which, if one may use the
much abused term "instinct," may be called the aggressive
instinct or tendency to aggressive self-assertion and the social instinct or tendency to association and cooperation with
one's fellows. In the science of politics it becomes a problem
of balance between government and freedom, the problem
to which Kant and those who followed him in the last century addressed themselves. Kant looked on freedom as an
end and restraint as a means, so that there should be complete freedom of individual action except as restraint was
needed to permit of general free individual action. We have
ceased to think of the matter in this way, but the problem
remains. As Lord Acton put it, all power corrupts; absolute
power corrupts absolutely. To make restraint efficient, men
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tend to give wide or even absolute powers to officials. In reaction, after experience of abuse of such powers at the expense of the individual life, men tend to limit and circumscribe them. From the time when a king coveted Naboth's
vineyard, the real danger to property has not been from
thieves but from rapacious rulers. Those set up to maintain
social interests have proved to threaten them. But when the
guardians of the public weal have been tied down too tight,
it has suffered from their ineffectiveness. Thus there have
been alternating periods of stress upon the general security
and upon the individual life. How the English and ourselves
worked upon this problem from the beginning of the twelfth
to the end of the eighteenth century is the story I am to tell.
Looking at the people with whom law, as we know it today, has arisen and been carried forward, we begin with a
kin-organized society. The household ruled by a house father
is the original from which develops the larger kin-group ruled
over by a patriarchal head and next the kingdom ruled over
by a patriarchal king. The idea of the ruler as father of his
country is one which long survives. Along with kin-organization, religious organization grows up. The king is high priest
of his people; the heads of kin-groups have priestly functions.
When, with the rise of political organization the kings are
expelled, a body of priests or a priestly oligarchy may develop which may become a political oligarchy. Thus a politically organized society may be under a patriarchal king, or,
as so frequently in a Greek city-state, a tyrant, a more or
less absolute ruler with no title to be king. Or it may be under
an oligarchy, a caste derived from the priestly heads of kingroups. Or at the other extreme it may be under the absolute
rule of a majority of a popular assembly. After achieving an
inner order, the first need of a politically organized society is
protection against other societies coveting the same territory
or seeking control of trade or even control over the people of
neigh-boring societies. Thus there comes to be military organization of society, sometimes, as in oriental military monar-
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chies, superposing a military and tax-gathering organization
upon local kin-organized and politically organized societies.
In Greece and in the East after the conquests of Alexander
and in the Hellenistic era these great military autocracies became the dominant type. They left the administration of
justice, the characteristic function of the state, to the inner
order of local political organizations, and existed only to collect taxes and tribute. St. Augustine said of them that they
were only large-scale robber bands.
In the Greek city-state, the head of the kin-group and the
council of the older, more experienced, and wiser kinsmen
had grown into the patriarchal king and his council of wise
men. With the expulsion or disappearance of the kings, came,
in different cities, the rise of tyrants, of oligarchies, and of
absolute rule of majorities in popular assemblies, so that
there was in the classical era a chronic condition of conflict
of demos or oligarchy with tyrant and of demos with oligarchy. Reflecting on this condition, the Greek philosophers
were impressed by the need of orderly maintaining of a social
status quo and of the security of social institutions, and
sought some theory of authority in an ideal politically organized society. They sought an ideal which should serve tor adjusting relations and ordering conduct by rule and principle
and should impose bonds of reason upon those who enacted,
upon those who applied, and upon those who were subject
to the rules. In the Minos, Socrates tells us that fire burns
and water flows in Persia, at Athens, and in Carthage, however much customs and rules of law might differ there. The
rising and setting of the sun, the phases of the moon, the
succession of day and night and succession of the seasons,
with their uniformity, regularity, and predictability, comparable to the regularity and predictability of the conduct
of the righteous man, showed an ideal order of things to
which the operations of government and administration of
justice ought to conform. What has been called the Greek
passion for law was a passion for orderly conduct of govern-
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ment according to this ideal. Through the Roman law and
the authority of Aristotle, Greek philosophy of social control was a strong influence on the later Middle Ages and in
political philosophy until recent times. The Romans developed social control through law, as we understand it today.
But the Roman law with which the formative era of the later
Middle Ages came in contact was the codified law of the
eastern Roman empire - the codification under Justinian.
It was the codification of the law of the empire in which all
the power of the magistrates, and so of judging, of issuing
edicts, and of proposing laws, and in consequence complete
lawmaking, law interpreting, and law applying authority,
were concentrated in an autocratic ruler. In western Europe
this polity came in contact with the Germanic polity of local
and national assemblies of free men and of the feudal lord
and his chief retainers. At the Norman conquest the Duke
of Normandy, become king of England, came in contact with
the Anglo-Saxon polity of the local assemblies of free men
and the national assembly and the king and his chief retainers as his wise councillors. Moreover, this contact took
place under the influence of the medieval faith in custom.
Throughout the course of development which leads to the
beginnings of the system of Anglo-American law or, as we
call it, the common law, there is the problem of, on the one
hand, effective ordering of contact in a civilized society, and,
on the other hand, such limitations of and checks upon those
to whom that ordering is committed as to preserve due balance between the general security and the individual life.
Of the two chief systems of law in the world of today one,
the modern Roman or civil law, is characteristically administrative; the other, the English or common law, is characteristically judicial. In antiquity, while originally the ultimate
lawmaking power was theoretically in the Roman people,
the Roman law grew chiefly through the edicts of the magistrates and the writings of the jurisconsults. The Roman king,
and the judicial magistrate who succeeded him, did not de-
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cide cases in person. The issue to be tried was framed before
him. But he then appointed a judex to hear and decide the
case. The latter was not a lawyer and got expert advice on
the law from a jurisconsult. There was no strong permanent
bench of judges. When under the empire there began to be
regular and permanent judges they were administrative officials. In legal theory the emperor was the first citizen of
Rome to whom the whole power of all the magistrates had
been delegated by a statute. Thus the theory of the legal order was administrative. The adjusting of relations and ordering of conduct was in the hands of administrative officials
who gave written directions to the judges how to decide and
determine by edicts the cases in which actions could be
brought and the grounds on which defences would be allowed.
On the other hand, in the Germanic polity the king had a
power of administering justice in person. He could be appealed to directly and could decide cases according to the
customary law. The English king sat in his court and decided important controversies and when later the king's
court developed into a system of courts, the judges in those
courts were his delegates, not to execute his will, but to decide cases according to the common custom of England, as
the king was bound to do when he sat in person. Whereas in
the final Roman theory law proceeded from the emperor was made by him - in the English theory it was pre-existing
and was found by the king or by his justices and applied to
the cases before them as something binding on them no less
than on the parties.
As a result of this difference of attitude toward the law,
the one system thinking of it as wholly the product of the
government, the other thinking of a fundamental law binding the agencies of government, there is a characteristic difference as to declarations of rights and guarantees of liberties in the two systems. In the modern Roman system they
are hortatory. They are exhortations addressed to the agencies of government as to how they ought to act. In the com-

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

mon-law system they are precepts of the supreme law of the
land, binding citizen and official alike and enforceable by the
courts in ordinary proceedings at the suit of persons aggrieved. Not long ago the federal government took possession of a private business through the army. The proprietors
at once went into court with an ordinary legal proceeding
against those who immediately acted and challenging the
legality of the seizure obtained a decree of the court in their
favor. Compare with this the incident of arrest of the deputies (members of the lower house of the legislative body) by
Napoleon III, then president of France. One of the deputies
stood out in front of the soldiers and read the constitution to
them. But the executive was judge of its own powers. No
one could do more than protest. The executive prevailed. In
the one system the remedy for action in excess of lawful
powers is an action for damages, a suit for injunction, or a
writ of quo warranto. In the other it is insurrection, rebellion. or revolution.
With these preliminary ideas, we come immediately to the
rise of legal guarantees of liberty in medieval England.
Medieval society was relationally organized. But it was
in contact with the ideas of a highly developed politically
organized society, the Roman empire, which had embraced
all but the whole civilized world of its day and still survived
in the eastern Roman empire at Constantinople. Thus in the
later Middle Ages two ideas of law came into competition
The Institutes of Justinian, an authoritative legislation foi
the empire, laid down that what the emperor pleased had
the force of law. The Digest of Justinian, likewise authoritative legislation for the empire, laid down that the emperor
was legibus solutus, absolved from the laws. On the other
hand, the Germanic law was thought of as a quest of the
justice and truth of the Creator. As Bracton put it, the King
ought not to be under any man but to rule under God and
the law. The church achieved on the Roman model a highly
developed religious organization of Christendom. The theo-

CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF LIBERTY

191

logian philosophers of the church developed from Greek
philosophy and Roman law a doctrine of a natural or ideal
law, of universal validity, of which human laws were only
declaratory. It was laid down in the philosophical treatises
that the law of the state could not derogate from the principles of natural law. But, as D'Aguesseau, Chancellor of
France, said later, in view of the political organization of his
time, that was a difficult and dangerous question. There was
nowhere for an individual to go if a positive rule laid down
by the king contravened principles of natural law. This
should be compared with the way in which English jurists
and judges from the thirteenth century on steadfastly opposed the law of the land to royal encroachment and oppressive action of the king's agents.
As the church organized all Christendom as a universal
religious society, the universities, in which the Roman law
of Justinian was taught after the twelfth century, and from
which the Roman law gradually spread over the Continent,
postulated all Christendom as an empire - the empire of the
Christian emperors, Constantine and Justinian. It need not
be said that although the universities did succeed in establishing the Roman law (as they made it into the modern
Roman law) as a universal law, the idea of all Christendom
as one politically organized society was not achieved as a
political fact. It remained an academic postulate, becoming
a juristic ideal. Instead in the sixteenth century separate centralized, politically organized states arose to become the nations of the next three centuries and the separate, independent state became the paramount organ of social control. In
England, the idea of all Christendom as an empire did not
even become a legal ideal.
English law was a law of the courts, a law of the lawyers
and judges, taught in the societies of lawyers which have
come down from the Middle Ages to England of today. The
law of the Continent was a law of the universities, a law of
professors and academic commentators, taught from the
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texts of Justinian. Thus the lawyers on the Continent were
trained in an academic tradition of interpreting Justinian's
codification as legislation binding on all Christendom as an
empire. English lawyers were trained in a tradition of a
common custom of England, ascertained, declared and administered in the king's courts. The one thought of law as
proceeding from the ruler, whose will was law, although he
ought to will what the ideal natural law prescribed. The
other thought of the ruled and the officials and agents of the
ruler alike as under a fundamental law of the land having
a higher authority and ascertained rather than made.
But what became the established English doctrine was not
settled without a struggle. There was a severe contest between the feudal idea of organization and the political idea
derived from Rome, with the church favoring the political
idea so far as it made for universality, but opposing it so far
as it attributed absolute powers to temporal rulers, at variance with the dictates of Christian morals, at variance with
the jurisdiction of the church, and in conflict with the relations of the church to the individual Christian.
As Duke of Normandy, William the Conqueror had long
been at work imposing a measure of discipline upon the
barons who held of him and working out an efficient government for his duchy. As King of England he had the experience, the strength of character, and the will to organize a
strong central government in his realm. Through the great
survey known as Domesday Book he established the crown
as the ultimate landlord. Thus he was both political ruler
and paramount landlord, and in that time, in a relationally
organized society, the latter was the more significant position. But the mere fact that he was in this relational position
toward all Englishmen had momentous consequences, as later
developed. The relation of lord and man involved reciprocal
rights and duties. It had always to be asked what was customary and reasonable and fair in that relation. Here was
opportunity for clash between the role of ruler and the role
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of landlord; between the Roman imperial idea and the Germanic idea, here reinforced by the natural law idea of the
later medieval theological philosophers. I have already spoken of the proposition of Bracton that the king was under God
and the law. Bracton was a clergyman (an Archdeacon) but
was also a lawyer and a judge. In that famous text we can
see him speaking both in his clerical and in his judicial capacity. That it was a commonplace at the time is suggested by
another book of the same century, the Mirror of Justices, a
book of no intrinsic merit or authority, which, however,
passed into the current of our legal thought in the contests
between the courts and the crown in the seventeenth century
and so helped form our Anglo-American public law. In the
chapter of the Mirror on abuses the first and chief abuse
noted is "that the king is above the law, whereas he ought
to be subject to it, as it is contained in his oath."
After the conquest the national council, which had been
the assembly of the wise men of the nation became instead
the king's court of his feudal vassals. The king's revenue became chiefly feudal aids and incidents of tenure. The Middle
Ages did not distinguish jurisdiction and ownership, imperium and dominium. The feudal lord had jurisdiction by
virtue of ownership; as landlord he was also ruler and judge.
Thus, as the feudal landlord of whom all land in the kingdom was held, the king became the head and source of all
jurisdiction. As the books put it, he was the fountain of justice. Also there was a centralization of administration in his
court. First, financial administration was organized and put
in an efficient system. Then the administration of justice was
more and more taken from the local courts, which had come
down from before the conquest, and the courts of the local
lords. Here were the materials for absolute monarchy such as
developed on the Continent. The king's court, whose counsel
and consent were the only limitations on his authority or
checks on his power, was made up of his vassals. Even the
spiritual lords were to do homage to him for their possessions
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and in token of their secular dependence. But alongside of
this feudal position was his customary position, surviving
the conquest. He was not only feudal overlord, he was king
of the nation, the son of the kin. His council was the traditional assembly of the wise men of the nation. The laws by
which he ruled were the settled customs which his people
claimed from him as of right their own at his coronation.
Quite apart from the feudal organization the people were
bound to him by oath and he to them by the promises at his
coronation and by charter of liberties. The king was fountain
of justice. He was not fountain of law.
This combination of new and old relations imposed on
the king a heavy burden of business and required appointment of a minister to represent him in the kingdom as the
sheriff from before the conquest represented him in the shire.
This minister was called justiciar. He was the representative
of the king in all affairs. In the king's absence he was regent
of the kingdom. Whether the king was present or absent the
justiciar was the head .of administration of finance and of
justice. Under him there was a body of what might be called
secretaries; a body of king's clerks or chaplains (for those
were times when reading and writing were confined to the
clergy) the chief of whom was called Chancellor and later
became, as it might be put, the king's secretary of state for
justice. But William I carried on a very great part of the
business of the state in person. He was strong enough to appoint a great baron to be justiciar. Under the less capable
William Rufus the justiciar became prime minister, and instead of a great baron a chaplain or clergyman-lawyer favorite of the king held that great office.
So far as any king of England could be, William the Conqueror, was an absolute irresponsible ruler. He was a strong,
determined, hard working man, wise enough not to be a
tyrant although he had his hand in every part of the business of the kingdom. On the other hand, his successor, William Rufus, was the worst type of tyrant. He lacked his
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father's capacity for business and the government of his
justiciar was irresponsible and wantonly oppressive. His
brother and successor, Henry I, was as able as their father,
the Conqueror, and as despotic as William Rufus. But he
organized administration and thus put a check upon his own
caprice.
"Form," says Jhering, "is the sworn enemy of caprice, the
twin sister of liberty.... Fixed forms are the school of discipline and order, and thereby of liberty itself." Form and
routine are the only safeguard of a people under an autocracy. Imposition of form and routine upon those who exercised the king's authority was a step toward the supremacy
of law which was to become characteristic of the English
polity.
Under the three Norman kings, the king and the people
supported one another in establishing and maintaining a national system as against the disintegrating system of local
feudal jurisdictions. The great vassals of the crown were
their common enemy. Hence William Rufus and Henry I,
when hard pressed by their vassals, were able to buy the
help of the country by promises. The king feared to increase
the jurisdiction of the great barons and so upheld the people
in their customary liberties. In the second section of the
Charter of Liberties granted by Henry I the tenants of the
barons are to be secured against their landlords, and in the
fourth section the barons are to "hold themselves in check
toward their tenants." A century later the barons are claiming liberties from the king and now the interest of the people
at large is with the barons. In the articles of the barons, leading to Magna Carta, the liberties of the free man, not simply
of the king's tenant in chief, are regularly demanded.
Under Henry I we get the organization of the king's court
which is to become the king's courts of common law in which
the liberties of the Englishman come to be enforced, and the
first charter of liberties in which those liberties are to be
defined. Henry I organized the administration of the jus-
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ticiar. He now had a staff selected from the barons or vassals
of the crown more nearly connected with the royal household
or qualified to act as judges by their knowledge of the law.
They made up the highest court of the nation; the king's
court, attendant upon the king; in practice, and in its derivative the court of King's Bench, long afterwards in theory
held before the king in person. In time this king's court separates into the High Court of Parliament, legislature and in
its upper branch supreme court of judicature, and what becomes the courts of justice. But already it is on one side a
sort of judicial committee of the whole court of vassals, by
which all appeals are decided and to which all suits may be
called upon application of the suitors. Its functions are still
undifferentiated. It has to do with assessment and collection
of revenue. In its capacity of royal council it takes part in
the revision and registration of the laws and charters which
it attests. Below it there is still the old judicial machinery
from before the conquest, the county courts, the hundred
courts, and the local franchises by virtue of which local landlords held courts and administered justice to their tenants.
Taxation and the making of laws are out of its sphere. They
belong to the king and the national assembly, now composed
of his vassals. But the court out of which sprang the common-law courts was manned by judges of rank and dignity
so that from the beginning the common-law judges were
strong enough to uphold the traditional liberties against the
most masterful kings.
Under the Norman kings the functions of the national
council were more nominal than real. But the form of participation in authorizing taxation and in legislation was retained. In the amendment of old laws by William I and
Henry I the immemorial counsel and consent of the barons
is recited, as to this day a statute recites that it is enacted
by the advice and consent of the lords, spiritual and temporal, and the commons. Thus from the beginning of the
English polity there is a protest against the doctrine of the
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Romanist lawyers of the Continent, based on devolution of
all legislative power upon the king, that what pleases the
king has the force of a law. But the further development in
this direction belongs to political history.
On the other side, the charter of liberties of Henry I defines liberties in characteristic English fashion not by abstract pronouncements but by dealing with concrete abuses,
from which lawyers may derive principles to meet later and
newer abuses. The Charter of Henry I has to do immediately
with the autocratic government under his father and particularly his brother and the extortionate exactions and
abusive exercise of powers in connection with the incidents
of tenure. Reliefs payable by the heir who succeeded to an
estate, fines payable upon alienation of an estate, aids payable when the lord had to 'be ransomed or sustained an extraordinary expense on making his eldest son a knight, or when
his eldest daughter was married, guardianship of infant heirs
and sale of the marriage of heirs and heiresses, were the
sources of royal revenue and afforded means of unreasonable
exactions, beyond what was customary, of wasting estates,
and of oppression of widows and daughters of deceased
tenants. These incidents of tenure were to be enforced in accordance with the provisions of the charters providing for
them and according to the customary law.
We may date the rule of law definitely from the reign of
Henry II. He was by nature a lawyer and a man of business.
From the beginning of his reign he set out to put order on a
permanent basis. By a steady system of reforms he made the
administrative machinery, which under Henry I had been
regulated by routine, part of a constitution of government
set forth in laws. He sought to carry to completion an organization of government which should make return to the
anarchy of independent feudal lords and jurisdictions impossible. The obstacles to this policy were opposition of the
barons and of the clergy. He had to compel the barons to
suffer restriction of their hereditary jurisdictions to the nar-
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rowest limits. He had to make the clergy, in all matters not
purely spiritual, subject to the ordinary process of the law.
He succeeded in the contest with the barons. In the contest
with the clergy he was humiliated. Yet he succeeded in his
ultimate aim of reducing all men to equality before the same
system of law. Perhaps the most significant of his achievements was the grand jury which provided efficient detection
and prosecution of offenders while protecting individuals
against unfounded prosecutions either private or by officials
of government, and the trial jury which superseded trial by
battle and the crude ordeals and compurgation and made
possible rational instead of mechanical trial.
John was an able soldier but a bad ruler. His recurrence
to extortionate exactions and oppressive practices in the enforcement of incidents of tenure and his high-handed unlawful seizures of property for his use brought on a contest with
the barons -in which they found a program for the redress of
grievances in the Charter of Henry I. They compelled John
to renew this charter with large additions, and in securing
what they claimed as their constitutional rights they bound
the king -to observe the same rules toward all free men.
The ground plan to which the common-law polity has built
ever since was given by the Great Charter. It was not merely
the first attempt to put in legal terms what became the leading ideas of constitutional government. It put them in the
form of limitations on the exercise of authority, not of concessions to free human action from authority. It put them as
legal propositions, so that they could and did come to be a
part of the ordinary law of the land invoked like any other
legal precepts in the ordinary course of orderly litigation.
Moreover, it did not put them abstractly. In characteristic
English fashion it put them concretely in the form of a body
of specific provisions for present ills, not a body of general
declarations in universal terms. Herein, perhaps, is the secret
of its enduring vitality. Like -the Constitution of the United
States it is a great legal document. Like the Constitution it
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lent itself to development by lawyers' technique. It did not
foreclose legal development by universal abstract clauses.
It did not seek to anticipate and provide for everything in
time to come. When recent historians, affecting to overthrow
the lawyer's conception, tell us that its framers meant no
more than to remedy this or that exact grievance of a time
and place and class by a particular legal provision framed to
the exigencies of that grievance, they tell us no more than
that the method of the Great Charter is the method of English law in all ages. The frame of mind in which it was drawn
was nothing less than the frame of mind of the common-law
lawyer; the frame of mind that looks at things in the concrete, the frame of mind that prefers to go forward cautiously, on the basis of experience, from this case to the next case
as justice in each case seems to require. Exactly because it
is an example of the sure-footed Anglo-Saxon's habit of dealing with things as they arise and in the light of experience,
it has been able to maintain itself as the foundation of English and American public law for seven centuries.
Historians now tell us that Magna Carta goes back by way
of the charter of liberties of Henry II and the like charters of
Stephen and Henry I to the charter of liberties of Cnut. But
this is only its formal pedigree. In substance it is another
thing. In substance it formulates ideas and realizes principles
which are at the foundation of medieval social and political
life. Thus if its formal roots are in the Anglo-Norman writcharter and the Anglo-Saxon writ, its material roots are in
the whole legal and political thought of the twelfth century
and so in the Germanic law as affected by the law of the
church and by the Roman law. Exacted by a combination of
land owners, church, and merchants, and granted by a king,
it recognizes the centralized judicial and administrative system which made the common law possible, but is not exactly
a constitution, nor a statute, nor a treaty, nor a compact, nor
a declaration of rights, and yet has something of all of these.
What stands out is the legal quality. For in the Middle Ages
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men thought of human welfare in the aspect of legality as
distinctly as today they think of it in the aspect of utility.
Men thought of society as held together by a system of reciprocal rights and duties, involved in relations, and half
human, half divine. Authority was partitioned between
church and state. The state was divinely ordained as a remedy for sin and an agency for promoting justice and right.
The supremacy of law, a fundamental dogma of our common
law, one, moreover, which we trace back to Magna Carta, is
but the supremacy of right divorced at the Reformation from
its theological element.
John used the powers of the crown and the administrative
machinery which the genius of his father had provided, not
for wise national purposes but to oppress every class in society. He exacted more from the barons than had been customary. He oppressed the smaller landlords both indirectly
through their lords and directly through his administrative
officials. He attacked the church, whereas in the medieval
polity it was fundamental that church and state were coworkers in maintaining the social order. He made heavy
money demands upon the merchants without giving them in
return protection and good government. He used the administrative agencies of protection as instruments of extortion.
Thus he united all interests and classes against him. Although
the great charter was exacted by the barons, all these classes
were behind it and it sought in characteristic English fashion
to give concrete remedies to each for the concrete grievances
of each. No less in characteristic English fashion, instead of
overthrowing the administrative machinery of Henry II,
which John had abused, instead of wrecking orderly government and administration, which had been made instruments
of extortion, the 'barons demanded and obtained more precise and exact definition of the reciprocal duties and claims
in the relation of king and subject, of overlord and tenant in
chief, and a body of authoritatively declared legal limita-
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tions upon royal employment of the administrative machinery of the realm.
In one aspect the Great Charter is a redress of the grievances of the great land owners, imposing limits of order and
reason upon the king's exactions as feudal overlord. But the
grievances of the church are put first. It is thus also a redress
of the grievances of the church, imposing respect for the then
fundamental division of powers between the spiritual and the
temporal. In still another aspect it is a redress of the grievances of the merchants and traders, providing for uniform
weights and measures, freedom of travel, and freedom from
unjust taxation. Most of all, however, and in its general
aspect, it is a redress of common grievances of all. It calls for
reasonable fines, proportioned to the offence and to the offender. It calls for justice as something of right, not to be
sold, denied, or delayed. It calls for security of property,
which is not to be taken for the king's purposes without the
old customary payment. It calls for security of the person.
The free man is not to be imprisoned, or banished or outlawed or disseised or deprived of his established privileges
Without a lawful judgment or otherwise than according to
law. These last provisions, coming into our law by way of
Coke's commentary on Magna Carta and our American bills
of rights, have proved of enduring vitality. Interpreted and
applied by American courts in one hundred and fifty years
of constitutional legal development, they have proved equal
to the constraining of sovereign peoples, organized in sovereign states, to rule under God and the law.
Through these general provisions which, if devised for particular grievances of particular classes in a particular time
and place, yet were applicable to like grievances in any time
and place, the Great Charter established a system of constitutional government, and so is rightly revered as the source
of the surest agency of social and political stability in the
modern world and the symbol of that supremacy of law over
the agencies of government and those guarantees to the in-
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dividual man that administrative machinery, while guiding
him and protecting him, will not grind him down, which are
the proudest possession of Englishmen and their descendants
everywhere.
Rights secured by the Great Charter became in their turn
the basis or program of new claims which were the subject
of struggles running through the whole reign of Henry III.
In those struggles they were made good. The next reign sees
them accepted by the good faith and defined by the lawmaking and administrative genius of Edward I. The medieval
struggle for a constitution ends with his reign. For a generation that great ruler reigned as Henry II had done, showing
due respect for constitutional forms but exercising the reality
of despotic power. He elaborated and completed the organization of parliament, of the convocation, of the courts of
law, of provincial jurisdiction, as they were to stand substantially for seven centuries. His legislation was so full and well
done that the laws of the next three centuries are not much
more than an expansion of it. He long retained the substance
of royal power, control of finance; the right to talliage the
towns and the demesnes of the crown without the consent of
parliament. But he was compelled to give these up. The Confirmation of the Charters by Edward I marks the end of a
formative period in the political history and begins one of
legal political history of the English constitution. Here begins the legal order as a judicially maintained order guaranteeing liberty as it has stood in the English-speaking world
since that time.
In the next two centuries the English lawyers and judges
steadfastly apply the principles established in the thirteenth
century. In a case in 1338 the Court of King's Bench allowed
cattle taken in distress for not paying the king's taxes to be
replevied from the king's collector because the latter had no
warrant. An official could not seize the property of a subject
except in the legal manner and under authority of a lawful
warrant. If it is said that after all this was no more than in-
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sistence by the judges upon a matter of form, the answer is
that the form in such cases is a guarantee of the substance.
If the official pursues it he is acting within a lawful authority.
If he does not, having no lawful authority he is a private
trespasser. Compelling him to have and show authority
holds him to legal limits on what he does.
In another case about the same time certain persons were
convicted in the King's Bench of forcible disseisin, that is,
wrongfully putting another out of his freehold with force
and arms. Thereupon the court issued a writ of exegi facias
to outlaw them. The sheriff returned this writ setting forth
that the king, by a letter under the privy seal, i.e. a private
letter, had instructed him that he had pardoned the offenders
their trespasses and commanded that they should not be
molested on that account, wherefore by reason of the king's
message the sheriff had not executed the writ. The court
held that this letter did not authorize the sheriff to refuse to
act under the writ, and fined him and issued a new one. The
king could pardon offenders under the Great Seal. Also he
could when properly applied to, dispense with some particular provision of the law in favor of some particular person to
prevent great hardship - a power which was afterwards exercised by the Chancellor and became the basis of the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery. If the king had acted in exercise of this power and so notified the court, the court would
have recalled the writ. But the king in his individual rather
than his "official capacity could not write private letters to
the sheriff to interfere with the due course of justice in the
courts.
To appreciate the significance of this case it should be
compared with the practice of lettres de cachet in France.
These were letters issued under the privy seal and signed by
the king, countersigned by a minister, authorizing the imprisonment of some one or giving some one protection
against the' course of the law or delaying or stopping legal
proceedings. They could be obtained by any one of sufficient
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influence with the king or his ministers. Under them persons
might be imprisoned for life or for long periods on the most
frivolous pretexts, for the gratification of private pique or
revenge, without any reason being assigned. We are told that
the secretary of state issued them in a wholly arbitrary fashion and that in most cases the king was quite unaware of
their issue. Indeed, they were often issued in blank, that is,
without containing the name of the person against whom
they were to be used, leaving it to the person to whom they
were given to fill in such name as he liked. How this system
operated is well brought out in the story of the Count of
Monte Cristo. It might easily happen that the person so imprisoned did not know why or at whose instance he was held
and that the occasion and reason might be forgotten while
he languished in indefinite confinement. The English courts
would not tolerate such things.
Sir John Fortescue, who was Chief Justice under Henry
VI and lived a long time in exile in France during the Wars
of the Roses, as tutor to the Prince of Wales, son of Henry
VI, wrote a book somewhere between 1467 and 1471 in
which he compares English law with the law in France as to
the liberty of the subject. While his picture of the happiness
in England and the misery of the peasantry in France may
be somewhat over enthusiastic, we have here a picture by a
contemporary observer which brings out the achievement of
English judicial development and application of the Great
Charter.
Thus far I have spoken only of arbitrary action of the
crown. But cases of transgression of fundamental law by
parliament have even more significance for American constitutional development. In the medieval polity there was a
basic distinction between spiritual and temporal jurisdiction, and this had been guaranteed both by the last chapter
of the Great Charter and in the Confirmation of Charters
by Edward I. When, therefore, parliament undertook to
provide for the custody of the seal of a religious house other-
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wise than the provisions of the law of the church, the Court
of Common Pleas in 1450 said simply and plainly that the
statute was impertinent to be observed and void. Parliament
had attempted to do something that the fundamental law
put beyond its reach. Again, in 1506, the Court of Common
Pleas refused to give effect to a statute of Henry V which
would have had the effect of making the king a parson. No
one could be made a parson by a temporal act. The king
could not be given any spiritual jurisdiction without the
assent of the Pope.
In the sixteenth century came the Reformation, the rise of
strong centralized national governments in western Europe,
and an era of absolute monarchies which marks the seventeenth and eighteen centuries. In England, parliament and
the courts are in a struggle with the crown until it is settled
by the Revolution of 1688 that the English king is.still under
God and the law. The judicial securing of the rights guaranteed to Englishmen by the Great Charter was seriously
threatened. But it had been too thoroughly established in the
Middle Ages to be overthrown.
II
THE ERA OF THE TUDORS AND STUARTS

This second period begins in the time of what Maitland
calls the three R's, Renaissance, Reformation, and Reception of Roman law. The Humanists of the Renaissance were
hot likely to appreciate the enduring qualities of the English
common law. What they could see on the surface was that
its books were written in bad Latin and worse French, were
registers of writs, -alphabetical abridgments, and unsystematic reports of discussions of counsel and judges in framing
issues for trial, of decisions of the superior courts, and of
news of the profession along with privately published collections of statutes, neither complete nor authoritative. There
had been no adequate systematic treatise since Bracton in
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the thirteenth century. The civil law had been studied in the
universities since the twelfth century. Study of English law
was carried on in the societies of lawyers in severely practical
fashion. The Reformation had struck down half of the fundamental law which the medieval lawyer had regarded as
beyond the reach of temporal lawmaking. It would no longer
be possible for common-law judges to refuse to give effect
to statutes enacted by Parliament on the ground that they
encroached on the domain of the church and so were "impertinent to be observed." In 1535, the Year Books, which,
whatever they were, at any rate served the purpose of a continuous report of judicial decision since the time of Edward
I, come to an end. It looked as if the Reception of Roman
law, which was reaching Scotland, might reach England also.
At any rate, there were those who were urging it in the reign
of Henry VIII. There were projects for reforming the education of lawyers, projects for a code, and projects for and setting up of new tribunals not administering the law of the
land nor proceeding according to its ideals. The students of
law were petitioning, claiming that the common law was being set aside for the civil law and that business was leaving
the common-law courts. There seems to have been for a time
a real menace to the continuity of English legal history.
What this might have meant to our regime of constitutionally
guaranteed and judicially maintained liberty may be seen
when we note how hard it was for the courts to prevail in the
contest with the Stuarts in the next century.
It was a time when old creeds were being discarded, when
old institutions were being overthrown, when men were in
revolt against the past on the shoulders of which they were
standing, and were replacing authority by reason. That the
common law developed from the thirteenth to the fifteenth
century could survive in such a time is a testimony to the
vitality of its fundamental ideas.
What was more serious for the common-law tradition of
liberty under law judicially maintained, the time was one of

CONSTITUTIONAL

GUARANTEES

OF LIBERTY

207

administrative tribunals with a summary, Romanized procedure, and scant respect for the rights of the individual
Englishman when those who exercised the powers of politically organized society were active to achieve results for
the government. The King's Council, the Star Chamber, and
the Court of Requests are characteristic tribunals of this
period. They had the appearance of being modern and in
the spirit of the age as compared with the old courts tied
down by formal procedure and bound by an unsystematic
body of writs grown up to the exigencies of particular cases
and given stability and rigidity by three centuries of application in court and teaching by practising lawyers.
Relationally organized society was breaking down. The
church had been subjected to the king, which would have
been regarded a century before as in derogation of the first
chapter of Magna Carta. The Wars of the Roses had decimated and two masterful kings had humbled the baronage.
Parliament had given the king a power of legislation by proclamation which might have undone the constitutional development which had gone on from the time of Henry III.
Monarchs zealous to do things, impatient of medieval legal
limitations and, as Shakespeare put it, "rotten parchment
bonds," could not but be attracted by the eastern Roman
code and the doctrine that the sovereign was not bound by
laws. Elsewhere it was a time of rising, absolute personal
government, the France of Francis I, the Spain of Charles
the Fifth, and an English king could not patiently endure being less a king than the rulers of the two states which were
the models for those days.
On the other hand, the individual Englishman was acquiring a new importance and a new sense of independence. The
discovery of the new world, exploitation of natural wealth,
and expansion of trade and commerce led to adventurous individualism and a competitive acquisitive self-assertion which
was impossible in the social organization of the Middle Ages.
Authority, as the Middle Ages had relied upon it, had lost its
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hold. The writings of the Fathers of the Church and of Aristotle, and the laws of Justinian, were no longer unchallengeable - to be interpreted 'but not questioned. Private interpretation of the Bible, every man to read it and expound it
to himself, involved a claim of primacy for the individual
reason. If there were forces at work making for absolutism
there were others latent which would make for maintaining
and extending the guarantees of individual freedom.
Government under the Tudors was on the whole more
arbitrary than under the Plantagenets. Not all of the Plantagenets were strong rulers, while Henry VII, Henry VIII,
Mary and Elizabeth were possessed in high degree of courage and force of will. For over a hundred years they ruled
vigorously, often violently, and not infrequently cruelly. As
Fortescue had pointed out in his praise of the laws of England, the kings before the Tudors. had from time to time
sought to rule with a high hand and ignore the legal limits
of their authority. Plantagenet and Tudor, as occasion allowed, infringed the rights of individuals, exacted loans and
gifts as a mode of taxation, and dispensed with statutes.
They even, when Parliament was not sitting, met temporary
situations by edicts. Characteristically the English constitution did not precisely define the prerogative. All admitted
that there was a body of prerogative. All admitted there
were some things beyond the power of the crown. Where
lines were to be drawn had to be fought out in the seventeenth century. But there was one circumstance which made
it impossible for the Tudors to go far in oppression of the
people. They had no armed force at their beck and as arms
were in those days an armed people involved little beyond
what was an everyday household equipment and so the king
was surrounded by an army of his subjects. The array of any
county or of a ward of London could overpower what guard
the king had or could command. Hence if the laws were not
strong enough to restrain him none the less public opinion
backed up the laws effectively. From time to time these rulers
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could treat some individual arbitrarily and even barbarously.
But they could not indulge in any general, long continued oppression of the whole people. However tyrannical in their
household or their court, they were compelled to be cautious
in arousing the temper of the country. Henry VIII could procure the execution of wives or courtiers. But when he sought
to impose a heavy financial contribution without the consent of Parliament, he roused an irresistible opposition. He
was told that his subjects were English, not French; free
men, not slaves. The king's commissioners were mobbed.
Armed insurrection was threatened, and the king's officials
could raise no force to put it down. Henry VIII remembered
Edward II and Richard II and did not persist. Provisions in
American constitutions as to the right of the people to bear
arms preserve the memory of these episodes.
While the Tudors were hot tempered and high spirited,
they were not unreasonably obstinate like the Stuarts. Like
Edward I they knew when it was time to give in to the insistent demand of the nation for adherence to law. From time
to time their rule was resisted but it was not subverted. Yet
this very caution, this wise stopping short when it was time
to yield, this timely making of concessions, which enabled
them much of the time to rule despotically, might have gradually enabled encroachments destructive of the constitution.
The Stuarts had no such cautious discretion. They obstinately opposed all legal restriction and so brought about their
ruin and the establishment of legal guarantees of freedom.
Under the Tudor rulers there were no such conflicts of the
courts with the crown as arose later under the Stuarts. The
courts went on deciding as they had done since the fourteenth
century. Elizabeth wrote letters to the judges, telling them
what it was her will that they do, and inquiring why they had
not done it. But when the judges asserted the law and refused to comply, she pushed the matter no further. The significant cases in which the authority of the crown was exceeded were the extortions practiced by Empson and Dudley

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

under Henry VII, royal restrictions on imports under Mary,
and certain grants to favorites by Elizabeth.
A statute of Henry VII, which Coke tells us was in contravention of Magna Carta and of "ancient and fundamental
law," provided that justices of assize and justices of the
peace, without any presentment or finding of a jury, upon a
bare information before them on behalf of the king, should
have full power and authority in their discretion to hear and
determine all offences and contempts by any person against
any statute. Empson and Dudley were justices of the peace
and were also made "masters of forfeitures," a new office
created for them. Under the statute they exorted enormous
sums for the crown by enforcement of antiquated statutes.
As masters of forfeitures, in cases where it was claimed that
property had accrued to the king, they contrived by making
records of untrue claims, altering records, and making false
records, to prevent traversing (denying) the claims, so that
the owners could only make a petition and a compromise.
These cases did not get before the common-law courts. But
a short time before his death the king repented and ordered
that traverses be allowed in all cases and that such matters
should be determined according to the true course of the
law. An act of Parliament of the first year of Henry VIII put
an end to the taking of evidence in secret in such cases, recited the unlawful practices of Empson and Dudley, and provided for redress of those who had suffered. The statute of
Henry VII conferring wide, discretionary powers upon justices of assize and justices of the peace was repealed.
Coke tells us that Edward III attempted in many different ways to raise money from merchants or impose charges
upon imports without act of Parliament. Parliament succeeded in opposing these attempts and later statutes provided for lawful customs dues. After that, he tells us, "no
king imposed by pretext of any prerogative any charges upon merchandises imported into or exported out of the realm
until Queen Mary's time." Philip and Mary granted by
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letters patent to the corporation of Southampton that no
Malmsey wine should be imported into the kingdom except
at the port of Southampton and provided for a threefold
penalty to the crown in case of violation. Certain foreign
merchants brought Malmsey wines into the kingdom andlanded them elsewhere. Upon this the attorney general
brought an information against them in the Exchequer for
the penalty. The case was argued before all the judges in the
Exchequer Chamber upon demurrer to the information. The
judges held that the grant was a restraint of liberty contrary
to law and utterly void. Chapter 41 of Magna Carta is cited
for the decision. Also in an information by the attorney general in the Exchequer to recover a sum of 40 shillings a tun
imposed by Queen Mary on French wine brought into England, the court held on demurrer that this was contrary to
Magna Carta, which provided that all merchants should be
free to come to England and buy and sell "by the ancient and
right customs, quit from all evil tolls," except alien enemies
in time of war.
Two notable cases were decided in the reign of Elizabeth.
In those days there was property in certain offices, paid by
fees. Blackstone names offices among "incorporeal herditaments;" that is, certain offices were hereditary. The holder
of the office had an estate in it to him and his heirs. Other
offices were held in life estate or for a term. But the estate
in the office was property. Certain officials in the Common
Pleas held for life offices whereby they were entitled to make
certain writs and receive the fees therefor. The duties of offices of this sort were often performed by deputies who did
the work and paid the office holder well for the place. Such
being the case, the Queen granted to one Cavendish by letters patent a term for years in the office of making all of certain writs, and sent notice to the judges to admit him thereto. This the judges refused to do. Thereupon Cavendish induced her to write a letter to the judges under her signature
and private seal commanding them to sequestrate the profits
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of the office since the grant as well as those to ensue, committing them to some one under bond to Cavendish in the
event it should be determined that he was entitled to the
office. The judges considered this letter and decided that
they could not lawfully act on it because to do so would disseise of their freehold the officers to whom the making of
such writs belonged. Certain great men, friends of Cavendish, told the Queen of this and she then wrote another
private letter to the judges commanding them to admit him
to the office without further delay and leave it to the officers
so disseised to recover their offices by action at law. This letter was brought to the judges by two of the Queen's favorite
courtiers, the Lord Chancellor, Sir Christopher Hatton,
known as the dancing chancellor because he was said to have
secured his preferment by dancing with the Queen, and the
Earl of Leicester, then the reigning favorite. They told the
judges that the Queen had a great desire to provide advancement for Cavendish and had commanded them to hear the
judges' answer to the letter. To this the judges answered
that they could not obey the letter consistently with their
oath to administer justice according to the law of the land.
Upon report of this answer to the Queen, she ordered the
Chancellor (Hatton), the Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench
(Sir Christopher Wray) and the Master of the Rolls to hear
the judges as to their reasons for disobeying her commands.
The judges protested that this calling on them to pass on
the question at a private interview, instead of Cavendish's
bringing an appropriate legal proceeding to establish his
right, if he had one, and having the case decided after argument at which the present office holders could be heard, was
out of the course of justice and in consequence they would
not answer. It was for the office holders who were to be disseised to argue. They were then charged with not having
obeyed the Queen's orders, and replied that the orders were
against the law of the land so that no one was bound to obey
them, and cited many precedents, including chapter 39 of
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Magna Carta. The Queen, when this was reported to her,
had the good sense to drop the matter. It was not heard of
further.
But this did not stop the Queen's endeavors to provide for
courtiers at the expense of her subjects. She tried another experiment in royal grants which came before the courts finally
in the reign of her successor.
Under pretense of regulating the playing of cards by men
of "mean trades and occupations" (who, I suppose, it was
considered ought to be at work and could not afford "idle
games") Elizabeth made a grant to Darcy authorizing him
and his agents and deputies to provide playing cards and
prohibiting all others for a term of years from importing such
cards or making or selling them in the realm. On the strength
of this grant Darcy brought an action in the Queen's Bench,
setting up the grant and alleging that he had provided cards
accordingly, but that notwithstanding the grant the defendant brought cards into the realm and sold them in infringement of the plaintiff's monopoly. To this the defendant
pleaded the custom of London (guaranteed by chapter 13
of Magna Carta) that a freeman (i.e. a citizen, one of the
corporation of London) might buy and sell all things merchantable, alleged that he was a freeman and merchant of
London, that playing cards were things merchantable, and

that he bought and sold them accordingly. This was demurred to and the demurrer was twice argued in the last
year of the Queen's reign and decided in the first year of

James I. As counsel put it in argument, the case against the
patent had to be argued with caution because one who looked
at the majesty of the prince, like one who looked at the sun,
would be oppressed by its splendor. Or, as he put it in another way, where one hews above his head chips will fall in
his eyes. But the Queen had been content to have her grants
and patents scrutinized by the courts, as Cavendish's case
showed. So Dodderidge, an able lawyer, afterwards Justice
of the King's Bench, who, however, was inclined later to be
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subservient to James I, argued for the defendant. The court
held for the defendant, all the judges agreeing that a monopoly was against the common law and contrary to certain acts
of Parliament. The grant was held not only contrary to the
guaranteed liberties of citizens of London, but an unlawful
restraint of liberty. Not the least interesting feature of the
case is Coke's comment on the pretentious preamble to the
grant. As he says, privileges which in reality are prejudicial
to the public welfare often have more specious frontispieces
and more pretence of good than good and legal concessions.
In time of rising political absolutism these hypocritical preambles are to 'be seen. Before absolutist ideas obtain some
currency such preambles avail nothing. After absolutism is
established they are not needed. While absolutism is growing but feels the need of support, they are freely employed.
At present, in contrast with earlier practice in America, preambles of this kind have become common.
Such was the condition of the law when James I and his
successors undertook to set up in England an absolute monarchy after the fashion of the Continent. In this they were
opposed by Parliament on political grounds and by lawyers
on legal grounds. Many politicians supported the crown in
the long contest; and many members of the legal profession,
although as Sir Thomas Jones told his royal master, few
lawyers, were willing to do the king's will on the bench in order to gain a position to which their professional standing
and ability did not entitle them. But even these, as a rule,
could only be pushed so far. When the king demanded decisions which they could not make consistently with a pretense of law they, too, balked and had to be removed.
We have seen Queen Elizabeth writing letters to the judges
and sending emissaries to them in advance of litigation.
James I in 1615 began a practice of sounding out the judges
and getting their opinions privately in advance of litigation
in which the crown was interested. Desiring to have the private opinion of the judges whether Peacham, a Puritan cler-
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gyman, who had written a sort of Philippic against the government, could be convicted of treason, the king sent Bacon
(the Attorney General) to procure it. But when the question
was put to Coke, then Chief Justice of the King's Bench, he
answered that "this auricular taking of opinions, single and
apart, was new and dangerous." When, however, the other
judges had given their opinions, Coke agreed to give his in
writing, and wrote one against the prosecution. He afterwards yielded to the practice of giving opinions to the government in advance, which the king's persistence had established. When, however, the king summoned the judges before the council for refusing to stop proceedings in an ordiniary case between party and party when ordered to by royal
mandate, Coke, in answer to the question whether he would
stay proceedings on a future command of the sort answered
that "when the case should be he would do that which should
be fit for a judge to do." He was removed from his position
by the king.
Under the succeeding Stuart kings removal of judges for
decisions unfavorable to the crown or even for not agreeing
in advance to decide as the king desired became a habitual
practice. Charles I removed three. Charles II removed ten.
James II, in a reign of three years, removed thirteen - more
each year than his father had removed in twenty-four years.
Although there were many strong judges on the bench in
this period, under Charles II and James II a politics-ridden
bench, a seat on which was dependent on doing what the
exigencies of royal government demanded, sank to the lowest point in English judicial history.
A few examples will tell the story sufficiently. When
Charles I was trying to fill his exhausted treasury by forced
loans he applied to the judges and expected them not only to
pay what they would have had to pay on a legally granted
subsidy, but also to sign a paper recognizing the legality of
the collection. Sir Randolph Crewe, Chief Justice of the
King's Bench refused to sign and was removed. Also Sir
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John Walter, Chief Baron of the Exchequer, proved too independent and the 'king forbade his sitting in court.
Naturally the bad example set by James I and Charles I
was followed by the Long Parliament which impeached the
judges who had decided in favor of the crown in the ship
money case, although some of them, at any rate, gave their
honest opinions, not without some legal basis, for the limits
of the prerogative were then by no means settled.
To name a few of the judges removed by Charles II, in
1678 he removed four, Sir Vere Bertie, Justice of the Common Pleas, Sir William Wilde, Justice of the King's Bench,
Sir Edward.Thurland, Baron of the Exchequer, and Sir Francis Bramston, Baron of the Exchequer, all of whom were in
the commission for the trial of Reading, indicted on the testimony of the notorious false witness Bedloe. Apparently their
conduct at the trial was not satisfactory to the king. The
same year he removed Sir Richard Rainsford, Chief Justice
of the King's Bench in order to make way for Sir William
Scroggs, one of the worst names in English judicial history.
Scroggs only escaped impeachment by the dissolution of Parliament and it seemed prudent to the king to remove him, so
thoroughly obnoxious had he become. Sir Francis Pemberton, an excellent lawyer, Chief Justice of the King's Bench,
was demoted to the Common Pleas in 1683 as not sufficiently. favorable to the crown in the proceeding to forfeit the
charter of London. The same year he was removed from
the bench entirely for showing "so little eagerness" to convict Lord Russell. He was afterwards one of the counsel for
the seven bishops. In 1680, Sir Robert Atkyns, Justice of
the Common Pleas, was removed, for, among other things,
denying the king's power to forbid the publication of books
without an act of Parliament. William III restored him to
the bench as Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer.
It would take too long to go over the list of judges removed by James II. It includes the chiefs of each of the
common-law courts; Sir Edward Herbert, Chief Justice of
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the King's Bench, removed in 1687 for refusing to sanction
royal introduction of military tribunals with authority to inflict capital punishment without an act of Parliament; Sir
Thomas Jones, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, dismissed in 1687 for refusing the king, at his personal solicitation, an advance opinion in favor of a general royal dispensing power; and Sir William Montagu, Chief Baron of the
Exchequer, removed along with three of his colleagues in
1686 for opposing the king's opinion that he could do away
with the test acts by his own will. That the judges and the
profession as a whole stood so steadfastly for the law of the
land during these four reigns is one of the glories of the common-law bar. Indeed, Cromwell found the lawyers no less
determined and after a brief struggle to bend them to his
purposes said "the sons of Zeruiah are too hard for us" and
gave them up.
For the seventeenth-century legal and political philosophers the chief question was, how can one man or body of
men get authority over other men so that those others ought
to obey and may rightfully be made to obey them. On the
one hand, it was argued that God had given to some men
title to rule without the need of any consent. On the other
hand, it was urged that title to govern was derived from the
consent of the governed. The lawyer might hold either of
these as a political doctrine and yet be so trained in the legal
tradition and well read in the law books that he would insist
upon the limitations on royal authority which had been established in the medieval charters and judicial decisions under them and on the legal responsibility of those purporting
to exercise the powers of the king beyond those limits. This
explains much that seems inconsistent in the course taken by
some of the strongest lawyers of the time. Those who believed in divine right as a religious and political doctrine
might be willing to concede a great deal to royal prerogative
and yet, when it came to certain fundamentals, obviously
guaranteed by Magna Carta and backed by the course of de-
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cision since the fourteenth century, might be firm in resistance to royal infringement of them. Thus Chief Justice Herbert, who held for the dispensing power and in 1688 followed
James II to France, nevertheless refused a rule for execution of a soldier tried by a military tribunal without authority of Parliament. Likewise, Sir Thomas Jones, who supported the crown in the proceedings against the City of London, refused to give James II a favorable advance opinion in
favor of a complete and absolute dispensing power. Except
in cases in which it is not settled, the law as a taught tradition will hold judges in spite of political conviction, economic
interest, or personal inclination.
Sir Edward Coke (pronounced Cook) solicitor general and
then attorney general under Elizabeth, and Chief Justice of
the Common Pleas and afterwards of the King's Bench under James I, is the great figure in the contests between the
crown and the courts. He was educated at Trinity College,
Cambridge, and in law at the Inner Temple and called to the
bar in 1578. At the outset of his professional career, the same
year, he succeeded on behalf of the defendant in an action
for slander of a nobleman, one of the cases in which it was
laid down that an act of Parliament against common right
and reason was void. Even then his reputation for learning
was so great that he was made a lecturer at one of the Inns
within a year after his call. He was successively recorder of
Coventry, recorder of Norwich, and recorder of London, and
in 1592, Solicitor General. In 1593, he was Speaker of the
House of Commons, and in the same year Attorney General.
As a law officer of the crown he had to take part in some
state trials on the side of the crown in the days when procedure bore heavily against the accused and the ethics of advocacy on behalf of the prosecution were not what they afterwards became. He is much blamed today for what was
usual in advocacy in crown cases at that time and has some
parallel in sensational criminal trials in America.
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On the bench all appearance of subserviency to the crown
disappeared. He asserted judicial independence and opposed
all attempts of the king to stretch his prerogative. As will be
told more fully presently, he made it plain that the king had
no personal judicial power. When he with the other judges
was required to go before the council to justify a judgment,
he protested against the growing practice of calling the
judges to account in this way instead of reviewing the judgment for error in the due course of legal procedure. In 1610,
in opposition to the council, he gave it as his opinion that
the king could not create new criminal offenses by proclamation. In 1611, the Court of Common Pleas under his leadership discharged on habeas corpus a person imprisoned by
warrant from the High Commission. Later when he was appointed to that commission he declined to serve.
As a writer on the common law, in spite of a quaint, often
pedantic, style, and complete lack of arrangement in his commentaries, he has the highest authority. His First Institute,
or Commentary on Littleton (a treatise on tenures by a judge
of the reign of Edward IV), his Second Institute, a commentary on Magna Carta and the old statutes of Edward I,
his Third Institute, a treatise on pleas of the crown (i.e.
criminal law), and his Fourth Institute, a treatise on the
jurisdiction of courts, are books of authority, that is, they
are binding authority of themselves, not depending on the
authority of the statutes and decisions they cite. His reports
of decisions of the courts while he was at the bar and on the
bench had such authority that they were long, and by old
fashioned lawyers still are, cited as Reports, simpliciter,
without the name of the reporter. He is universally regarded
by lawyers as the oracle of the common law. No better
champion of liberty secured by law could have been found.
His constant rival was Bacon. A great philosopher, Bacon
was far from being Coke's equal as a lawyer. He was a
courtier and a politician, stood consistently for absolute
monarchy, and was in continual intrigue for political pre.
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ferment, while Coke was a lawyer pure and simple. But
Bacon's standing in letters and in philosophy have given him
an advantage with the laiety who are apt to think of Coke
as a narrow, pedantic lawyer who stood in the way of the
great plans of an enlightened philosopher. Writers of the
seventeenth century who reflect the ideas of the king and of
the party strong for unlimited royal prerogative, circulated
many derogatory stories of his attitude towards the crown
and his alleged subserviency. Partisans of Bacon depreciate
him as Bacon's rival. This, of course, he could not be except
as a lawyer. Ben Jonson's epigram upon him about the time
of his removal from the bench and Milton's lines a generation later, together with the opinion of the profession then
and ever since, tell more than the derogatory gossip dug up
three centuries later, in another era of growing absolutism,
and represented as the true Coke.
As to Coke's opposition to equity, we must remember what
Selden, a great contemporary legal scholar, had to say of it.
The chancellor who dispensed it was not necessarily a lawyer. He was and had to be a courtier and politician. He had
to be a supporter of extreme claims of royal prerogative. Under James II to hold his place he had to become an apostate.
The measure of his judicial action was his conscience, and,
as Selden put it, might have been the length of his foot, for
as one chancellor had a long foot and another a short foot
and another an indifferent foot, so one might have a long
conscience, and another a short conscience and another an
indifferent conscience. After Coke's time equity became systematized and was made part of the common-law system.
But this process was not complete till Lord Eldon, Chancellor almost continuously from 1801 to 1827. Two great American states would not receive it until its administration had
been thoroughly subjected to principles.
One of the outstanding events of the contest between the
crown and the courts was the conference between James I
and the twelve judges of England in 1612. It appeared that
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the High Commission, an administrative tribunal established
by Queen Elizabeth for the regulation of the church, had begun to take cognizance of temporal matters and deal with
lay offenders. This tribunal was wholly unknown to the common. law and decided according to no fixed rules and subject
to no appeal. When it sought to send its pursuivant to the
house of a lay subject and arrest him upon a complaint of a
wholly temporal nature, the Court of Common Pleas stopped
the proceedings with a writ of prohibition - a common-law
writ used where a court is proceeding beyond its jurisdiction.
To meet this judicial insistence on the supremacy of law it
was suggested by the Archbishop of Canterbury that the
King might remove from the judges any cause he pleased
and decide it in person; and the immediate business of the
Sunday morning conference of judges was to explain this
proposition and hear what the judges could say to it. The
Archbishop of Canterbury expounded the alleged royal prerogative, saying that the judges were only the delegates of
the king so that the king might do himself, when it seemed
best to him, what he usually left to these delegates. The
Archbishop added that this was clear if not in law yet beyond question in divinity since it could be shown from the
word of God in the Scripture. To this Coke answered on behalf of the judges that by the law of England the king in
person could not adjudge any cause. All cases, civil and criminal, were to be determined in some court of justice according to the law and custom of the realm. "But," said the
King, "I thought law was founded upon reason, and I and
others have reason as well as the judges." "True it was,"
Coke responded "that God had endowed His Majesty with
excellent science and great endowments of nature; but His
Majesty was not learned in the laws of his realm of England,
and causes which concern the life or inheritance or goods or
fortunes of his subjects are not to be decided by natural reason, but by the artificial reason and judgment of the law,
which law is an art which requires long study and experience
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before that a man can attain to the cognizance of it." At this
the King was greatly offended saying that in such case he
should be under the law which it was treason to affirm. Coke
answered in the words of Bracton, that the King ought not
to be under any man, but under God and the law.
Coke was in error historically in saying that no king since
the conquest had adjudged causes in person. Henry II had
done so and had even put out of court a learned clerk who
suggested arguments adverse to the judgment the king had
determined to render. But the kings had long ceased to sit
as judges and from the fourteenth century adjudication had
been the exclusive province of the judges. Magna Carta
called for the law of the land and that was something the
king was not competent to administer.
After his removal from the Bench, Coke sat in Parliament
from 1621 to 1628 and was conspicuous in political opposition to James I and Charles I. He took a prominent part
against royal monopolies, unlawful grants and like abuses
and was chairman of a committee to consider supply. He
spoke strongly for a remonstrance and petition to the king,
and stood boldly for the privileges of the House of Commons. The king proceeded highhandedly against the members who had opposed him. Coke was imprisoned, his papers
were seized, and prosecutions were begun against him on
trumped up charges. He was in prison for seven months. In
the new Parliament he was again active against the king's
arbitrary measures. But James I died not long after. In the
first Parliament of Charles I, Coke opposed grant of supply
without a redress of grievances and urged a petition to the
king according to the old precedents. The Parliament was
dissolved, and in order to prevent the more independent
members from sitting in the next one the king appointed
them (Coke among others) sheriffs in the counties in which
they lived. Coke was elected for another county, but did not
sit. In the third Parliament of Charles I, however, at the age
of 78, he took an active part, suggesting and succeeding in
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carrying the Petition of Right, which, with Magna Carta, the
Bill of Rights of 1688, the Declaration of Independence, and
the Constitution of the United States, stands as one of the
monuments of Anglo-American free institutions. While he
was on his death bed in 1633, the manuscript of his Second
Institute and all his papers were seized by direction of the
king under pretense of search for seditious writings. Only the
first eleven parts of his reports and the First Institute were
published in his lifetime.
In 1642, Coke's Second Institute, containing his commentary on Magna Carta, was published by order of the House
of Commons. This commentary was greatly relied upon in
the controversies between the colonies and the British government before the Revolution and furnished much of the
material for our American bills of rights. It is a foundation
document for the history of our constitutional law. The part
especially noteworthy is the long commentary on chapters
39 and 40 in which he takes them up clause by clause and
shows how they have been interpreted and developed by
legislation of Parliament, in the law books, and by judicial
decision. He considers the meaning of lex terrae, law of the
land, and shows that as far back as the reign of Edward IiI
the phrase, due process of law, was used as its equivalent. In
other words, law in that phrase meant more than an aggregate of laws and due process of law had much more than a
merely procedural meaning. As these phrases were put in our
American constitutions by lawyers who took the Second Institute for a legal Bible, this exposition needs to be remembered.
Again, he shows the broad principle behind the provision as
to disseising. No one is to be put out of his freehold or "put
from his livelihood" except by a lawful proceeding of which
he has full notice and in which he has full and fair hearing.
He explains the word liberties as meaning more than freedom of the physical person from arrest or imprisonment. This
meaning of liberty is of the first importance and he develops
it fully and goes elaborately into the legal remedies. But he
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shows that it had always been construed to cover "the freedoms that men have." Thus in an old case an ordinance that
every member of the merchant tailors' company should put
half of his clothes to be dressed by some cloth worker, member of the same company, under penalty for not doing so,
was held void as against the liberty of the subject who in
common right and reason had a right to put his clothes to be
dressed by whom he pleased. Those who have been arguing
recently that the word liberty in our constitutions refers only
to freedom from external restraint of the physical person,
need to note that the word was used by the framers of our
constitutions in the sense in which they found it used in the
law books from which they got their ideas of the guaranteed
rights of Englishmen as natural rights of men. Coke points
out that monopolies and impositions upon trade without authority of law come under the ban of deprivation of liberty.
Other features of importance for American constitutional
law are the discussion of searches and seizures in connection
with the clause in Magna Carta that the king would not
"send upon" a free man; the exposition of "taken or imprisoned," of "destroyed," of "judgment of his peers," and
of "lawful judgment." Here he considers the necessity of
giving one whose rights are to be affected by official action
a full and fair opportunity to meet the case against him something we have been forgetting in much summary administrative action nowadays. His discussion of the clause as to
denying or delaying justice is important also. The citizens of
Boston relied on it when the courts were closed under the
Stamp Act. Finally, the discussion of the law of the land as
the birthright of Englishmen was made good use of in the
contests with the British government which led to the Revolution.
After Coke's death came the famous case of Ship-money.
The king claimed a prerogative of assessing on seaports a
contribution towards providing and equipping ships of war
to guard against pirates and dangers involved in war. As
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Parliament would vote no supply until grievances were redressed, the king's advisers hit upon the idea of extending
the writs for ship-money to the whole kingdom. The sheriffs
were directed to assess every landholder and other inhabitant
according to their judgment of his means. Hampden, whose
assessment amounted to only twenty shillings, refused to pay
and the matter came into court. On account of its importance
the case was heard before all the judges in the Exchequer
Chamber. Seven of the twelve judges gave judgment for the
crown. The Chief Justice of the King's Bench and the Chief
Baron of the Exchequer held for Hampden on technical
grounds, although agreeing with the majority on the substantive question that the king could on his own allegation of
public danger require an inland county to furnish ships or
money by way of commutation for defense of the coast. Another judge gave a short written opinion in favor of Hampden. Croke and Hutton, two judges of reputation and experience, boldly pronounced against the claim of the crown.
An Act of Parliament in 1641 invalidated all the proceedings and declared against the asserted prerogative.
Meanwhile the courts, after the medieval precedents, were
enforcing the medieval fundamental law against Parliament.
The first case of this sort after the Prior of Castleacre's Case
was Lord Cromwell's Case in 1578, Coke's first important
case as counsel. The action was brought by a peer against a
clergyman for slander in saying that the lord liked those who
maintained sedition against the Queen's proceedings. After
the defendant's plea of justification had been held insufficient, Coke moved in arrest of judgment on the ground that
the plaintiff's declaration (i.e. statement of his cause of action) was bad for not properly reciting the statute of Richard
II on which the action was brought. If the statute was a public act the court would take judicial notice of it and the misrecital would not matter. If it was a private act it had to be
pleaded and the court could only go by the record before it.
But taking it as it was pleaded, the act was void because
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against law, that is, the law of the land, or as Coke expounds
more fully in the Second Institute, right and reason. As it
stood it had the effect of punishing those who had not offended. On this basis nineteenth-century American courts
commonly held statutes imposing liability upon those not at
fault to be wanting in due process of law.
Next, in 1610, came Bonham's Case, in which Coke sat as
Chief Justice. Here an act of Parliament, confirming the
charter of the Royal College of Physicians gave the incorporated society of physicians power to impose fines upon physicians offending against its rules, the fines to be payable half
to the crown and half to the society. Dr. Bonham having
been imprisoned for nonpayment of a fine imposed under this
provision brought an action for false imprisonment. The
Court of King's Bench held the imprisonment wrongful on
two grounds, (1) that the charter, confirmed by the statute,
did not extend the jurisdiction of the College of Physicians
beyond those practicing in London, and (2) the statute which
made the College, which got half of the fine, judge of its own
case, complainant, prosecutor, and judge, was against common right and reason and void. The court cited on this last
proposition the cases as to seals of ecclesiastical corporations
discussed in the first lecture, and a case in the reign of Elizabeth in which a statute in general terms was held not to be
so construed as to reach a result contrary to due process of
law. But Bonham's Case did not involve a mere matter of
interpretation. The question was whether Parliament could
validly enact that one should be both judge and party judge in his own case.
In 1615, the question came up again in the Common
Pleas in the case of Day v. Savadge. Here the authorities of
the City of London seized a bag of nutmegs, deposited on a
wharf belonging to the city, to be transported by water,
claiming a customary charge due the city. To this the plaintiff, suing in trespass, pleaded an immemorial custom that
freemen of the city (i.e. members of the corporation) were
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not subject to the charge, and alleged that he was a freeman of the city. The defendant denied the alleged custom
and claimed the benefit of an act of Parliament that when a
custom of London was in issue the court should apply to the
Mayor and Aldermen of the City to certify what the custom
was. The court held that it was "against right and justice
and against natural equity" to allow the Mayor and Aldermen to try and judge their own case by their own certificate.
The court said that even an act of Parliament to make a man
judge in his own case was "void in itself."
One of the clear prerogatives of the crown, the extent and
limits of which were not clear, was that of dispensing with
the operation of a particular law in a particular case for great
hardship. As far back as the Anglo-Saxon laws it was laid
down that if "the law was too heavy" one was to apply to
the king. This royal authority had become the basis of equity
jurisdiction of the Chancellor. But an undefined part remained in the king. James II, wishing to appoint Catholics to
commands in the army appoiited Sir Edward Hales colonel
of a regiment with a dispensation under the great seal to act
notwithstanding the statute requiring all office holders to
take an oath and receive the sacrament according to the rites
of the Church of England. An action of debt was brought
for the penalty prescribed by the statute and, the defendant
having pleaded the dispensation, the plaintiff demurred. The
case, brought in the King's Bench, was argued before the
twelve judges of England and eleven gave judgment for the
defendant on the ground that to dispense with penal laws for
necessary and urgent reasons was "an inseparable prerogative of the king," and that "no act of Parliament could take
away that power." The whole dispensing power was abrogated at the Revolution of 1688.
Again in 1695, in King v. Earl of Banbury, Lord Holt, one
of the great judges in English judicial history, said arguendo
that the courts could adjudge acts of Parliament to be void
and the question came squarely before him on a writ of er-
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ror in a case brought from the Mayor's Court in City of London v. Wood in 1701. The action was debt to recover for a
forfeiture to the city under a bye-law of the city by virtue of
an act of Parliament. It was held that the action could not
be brought in the court of the Mayor and Aldermen by the
Mayor and Aldermen on behalf of the Mayor and Aldermen,
the very persons who were to have the benefit of the forfeiture being judges in their own case. One of the judges
cited Day v. Savadge and Lord Holt cited and approved
Bonham's Case.
What was the fundamental law which the courts considered violated by the acts of Parliament in these cases? In
Day v. Savadge, Chief Justice Hobart spoke of natural law,
the ideal law of which we heard much in this country in the
eighteenth century and in our formative era before the Civil
War. But the English lawyers had always preferred to speak
of "the law of reason." What Coke speaks of as "common
right and reason" was what was meant. The law of the land,
declared by Magna Carta, forbade arbitrary and unreasonable governmental action, such as to punish the innocent and
to make one a judge in his own case. This idea came into our
bills of rights in the provisions against deprivation of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. Due process
of law meant according to the law of the land.
In King v. Earl of Banbury and City of London v. Wood,
Lord Holt had not perceived that the effect of the English
Revolution had been to set up a Parliamentary absolutism
after the attempt to set up a royal absolutism had failed.
Coke had been troubled between a claim of absolute sovereignty in Parliament and the medieval precedents he followed
in Bonham's Case. Blackstone was not clear about it in 1765.
The present English doctrine was not thoroughly received
till the nineteenth century. Much logical acrobatics has been
indulged in in order to push the present English doctrine
back into the medieval cases. There is no need of this. The
Revolution of 1688 made a profound change in the English
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constitution. The seventeenth-century polity, as set forth in
Coke's doctrine was the one we accepted at our Revolution
and put in our constitutions. When these instruments declare
themselves the "supreme law of the land" they use the language of Magna Carta as interpreted by Coke.
The history of constitutional guarantees of liberty in England culminates in the Bill of Rights of 1688. We have next
to turn to the history of such guarantees in the American
colonies.
Roscoe Pound.*
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